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Challenges to
Public Pensions
Chapter 12
Going Private in the Public Sector
The Transition from Defined Benefit
to Defined Contribution Pension Plans
Douglas Fore
The transition from private sector defined benefit to defined contribution
pension plans has been underway in the United States for over a quarter-
century, since the passage of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA) in 1974 and especially since the introduction of 401(k) accounts in
1982. By contrast, in the state and local government sector, pensions have
been and continue to be overwhelmingly defined benefit in type, perhaps
because ERISA does not apply to these plans. Additional factors contrib-
uting to the continuation of public sector defined benefit pensions likely
include the relatively high degree of unionization of state and local gov-
ernment employees, and the fact that early retirement features commonly
associated with defined benefit plans have meshed well with many public
employer personnel goals in the past.
Nevertheless, there is evidence that the public sector pension environ-
ment is beginning to evolve. A small but growing number of state and local
governments have switched or are contemplating switching from a defined
benefit to a defined contribution plan. If these pioneers prove successful, in
terms of employee and employer satisfaction, the public sector may follow
the transition trend experienced in the private sector over the last quarter-
century. If this transition process spreads, it will mark a major shift in the way
in which retirement income is provided for a substantial number of Ameri-
can workers and retirees. And if more state and local government pension
plans transition to a defined contribution format, this could potentially have
a profound impact on capital markets, given the substantial size of public
pension assets.
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Key Aspects of Public Sector Defined Benefit Pensions
As noted elsewhere in this volume, public pension benefit formulas vary
widely within a state, and between states. My goal here is to highlight several
issues pertinent to the public sector transition from defined benefit (DB) to
defined contribution (DC) pension plans. I focus on benefit formulas, cov-
erage and vesting rules, and funding patterns, derived from data contained
in the PENDAT97 survey described above (see Hustead and Mitchell this
volume; Zorn 1997, 1998).
Vesting requirements of public DB plans. Vesting refers to how long an em-
ployee must work to earn a legal right to an eventual retirement benefit
under a plan. In public sector DB plans, a worker is generally vested after
either five or ten years of employment; just under half of all plans vest em-
ployees after five years, with a similar percentage vesting after ten years.
Only a very few plans grant pension rights immediately, and likewise few
delay vesting for more than ten years. It should be noted that one plan can
have different vesting rules for workers hired at different points in time, as
well as different benefit rules. Eligibility for non-duty-related disability and
survivors benefits typically requires the same vesting period as for pension
benefits; duty-related disability and survivors benefits generally vest immedi-
ately, although some plans do require the same vesting period as for pension
rights.
DB plan benefitformulas. Public pension benefit formulas vary widely within
a state, and also between states (Hustead and Mitchell this volume). But de-
spite this diversity, retirement benefits are calculated as a percentage offinal
average salary in most defined benefit plans. Final average salary may be de-
fined as the worker's salary in the last year of employment, or an average of
the last three or five years of work. Many plans also establish minimum age
and service requirements (e.g., fifty years of age and twenty years ofemploy-
ment) in order to qualify for a pension with full credit for accrued bene-
fits; these are commonly associated with police and fire department plan
criteria.
Benefit accrual patterns for public employees covered/not covered by so-
cial security appear in Figure 1. Corresponding pension benefits received
after 30 years of service, as a percentage of final average salary, are given in
Figure 2. In the California State Teachers' Retirement System (calsters), em-
ployees accrue benefits at a constant 2.0 percent per year, which happens to
be the average annual benefit accrual rate for all public sector workers. In
1996, the average DB benefit for state and local government workers covered
by social security and with thirty years of service was 57.8 percent of final
average salary; for workers not covered by social security, it was 68.5 percent
of final average salary.
Constant-rate accrual of benefits appears to be the exception rather than
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Figure 2. Average benefit after 30 years of service as percent of final average salary. Source: author's calculations.
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the norm, however, in the public sector. Most public DB plans have differ-
ential accrual rates, usually on either side of twenty years of service. For ex-
ample, the Alaska Teachers' Retirement System benefit accrual rate is 2.0
percent of final average service for the first 20 years of service, and 2.5 per-
cent per year thereafter. By contrast, the City of Fresno Employees' Retire-
ment System accrual rate is 2.0 percent of final average salary for the first
twenty-five years, then falls to 1.0 percent per year thereafter. Some teachers,
school employees, and general employees in public DB plans not covered
by social security have annual benefit accrual rates rise by 0.30-0.40 per-
cent per year of service on average, but plans for workers not covered by
social security do provide lower benefit accrual rates. For example, workers
in the California Public Employee Retirement System (Calpers)-who are
not in social security-accrue benefits at a constant 1.25 percent per year;
their resulting pension equalling only 37.50 percent of final average salary
after thirty years of service, the lowest level of benefits offered by any major
public plan in the country. This relatively low benefit level provided by Calp-
ers may explain why many counties and municipalities in California have
established their own distinct plans with different DB formulas.
Benefit formula design in the public sector appears to be motivated by
three factors, the most important of which appears to be whether or not
the employee group is covered by social security. Only a minority of plans
covering workers covered by social security explicitly integrate their bene-
fit formulas with expected social security benefits by, for example, offering
higher benefit accrual rates for salary ranges above the social security earn-
ings threshold. It must also be acknowledged that about a quarter of state
and local government employees are not covered by social security; never-
theless as ofl983, state and local governments no longer have the option of
opting out of social security.l In any event, as noted above, workers outside
the social security system have more generous benefit accrual formulas than
do workers included in social security. A second apparent factor in benefit
formula design has to do with the employee group covered: local govern-
ment plans are almost always more generous than state plans. For example,
the accrual rate in the City of San Jose Federated City Employees' Retire-
ment System is a flat 2.5 percent per year of final average salary, so a worker
with thirty years of service would retire with a benefit of 75 percent of final
average salary. This is double the benefit of an otherwise similar employee
in the state-level Calpers plan. A third factor influencing public plan design
is public employee unions, which tend to bargain over pension accrual rates
with state and local governments.
DB planfunding status. The U.S. Government Accounting Standards Board
has required state and local government pension plans to compute liabili-
ties using a common set of methods to produce a pension benefit obligation
(PBO) figure for each plan since 1987. In practice, public pension plan ad-
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ministrators have wide latitude in terms of the assumptions used for future
real salary increases and turnover rates, as well as future inflation and in-
vestment income return rates (Hustead this volume). As Mitchell and Smith
(1994) note, the spread between expected investment returns and the ex-
pected growth rates ofemployee compensation is equal to the real discount
rate of future pension liabilities, and a larger gap implies a lower present
value offuture liabilities. Mitchell and Smith found funding status in public
DB plans negatively related to the degree ofemployee unionization and state
fiscal pressure, and they also found persistence in past funding patterns.
Public sector defined benefit plans are fairly well funded in the 1990s
(Mitchell et al. this volume), but plan funding status varies according to
plan type. For example, when we compare teacher/school employee plans,
police and fire department plans, and general plans, we find that the general
plans have the highest funding ratios and teacher/school employee plans the
lowest (in the case of teacher/school employee plans, roughly a third have
funding ratios below 70 percent). This is depicted in Figure 3. Where public
plans are less than fully funded, the amount is substantial: the mean time to
amortization of the unfunded liability is approximately twenty-three years
at current funding rates. We find no correlation between a state's per capita
income or tax burden and the funding status of its defined benefit plans
in the 1996 data.2 This is perhaps surprising, because different patterns of
state income and population growth generate different incentives in terms
of funding levels. For example, rapidly growing sun-belt states and munici-
palities might be expected to underfund their plans relative to slowly grow-
ing Northern states. States attracting large numbers of migrants, whether
from within or without the United States, might experience more rapid
growth in their tax bases than in their actuarially accrued pension liabili-
ties. In this case, DB plan underfunding might be anticipated, since rapid
tax base growth could amortize unfunded actuarial liability without chang-
ing tax rates. Conversely, states and municipalities with static or declining
tax bases have an incentive to fully fund or overfund their plans in order to
avoid very large tax increases at some point in the future.
DB plans and mobility within a state. Public pension DB plans diverge con-
cerning how readily they permit employees to transfer their pension rights
to other public sector DSB plans within the same state. Roughly a third of
these pension plans have reciprocal agreements with other plans in the same
state for transferring or combining worker benefit rights accrued elsewhere.
Where reciprocal agreements do not exist, employees may still have the
option of transferring service credits. For example, roughly 40 percent of
plans allow veterans to purchase service credits for military service at either
full cost or less than full cost. Table 1shows the matrix ofoptions available to
employees. Approximately 60 percent ofall public defined benefit plans dis-
allow transfer ofany accrued benefit rights across plans; furthermore, fewer
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TABLE 1. Defined Benefit Plan Portability Method for Determining Purchase of
Service Credits Earned Elsewhere
Less than
Purchase
Type of service Full cost Full cost No cost not allowed
State government 22% 15% 4% 59%
Local government 27% 14% 2% 57%
Out-of-state government 15% 6% 1% 78%
Federal government 14% 8% 1% 77%
Military 24% 23% 6% 47%
Other 12% 5% 0% 82%
Source: Author's calculations from PENDAT97 database.
than 20 percent of plans allow workers to purchase service credits earned
in either the federal government or other state governments. Plans which
do permit employees to purchase service credits are approximately twice as
likely to require them to purchase credits at full cost rather than at less than
full cost.
DB pension plans' impact on mobility more generally. Lack of portability is one
of the well-known drawbacks to defined benefit pension plans. Under a de-
fined benefit pension regime, workers who stay with the same employer
retire with larger pensions than similarly compensated workers in similar
defined benefit schemes who change employers over the course of their
careers. This can be illustrated with a simple numerical example where we
assume that pension rights are fully acquired after five years. Consider a
worker who begins employment at age 35 with a salary of $25,000, receives
annual raises of four percent, and retires at age 65. The worker faces two
alternative career path options. On the first path, the worker can remain
with the same employer for thirty years, accruing pension benefits at a rate
of 2 percent per year that are paid as a percentage of final salary. On the
second path, the worker quits his first job after either ten or twenty years.
The pension benefits earned under the two paths are shown in Table 2.
Remaining with the first employer until retirement at age 65 would pro-
duce an annual pension benefit corresponding to the first year's service of
$1,622, two percent of the last year's salary. The annual benefit correspond-
ing to the first ten years of service would be $16,217. However, if the worker
quit after ten years, at age 45, the benefit eventually payable at age 65 from
the first employer would be only $7,401, corresponding to 2 percent ofsalary
at age 45 for each year of service to the time he quit. Discounted at a rate
of 6 percent for twenty years, the present value of the benefit received by
staying with the first employer is roughly $2,800 per year larger. This may
not seem to be much for a forty-five-year-old worker contemplating a job
switch, but at age 65 with expected longevity of twenty more years the future
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TABLE 2. Impact ofJob Changes on Retirement Benefits in Defined Benefit
Pension Plans
Worker's
age
35
45
55
65
Salary
$25,000
$37,006
$54,778
$81,085
Benefit based on
current salary
o
$7,401
$21,911
$48,651
Benefit based on
final salary
$1,622
$16,217
$32,434
$48,651
Source: Author's calculations.
value of this benefit would be approximately $28,000 larger. A worker who
switched at age 55 after twenty years of service loses even more.
Several factors could exacerbate this benefit differential. For instance,
high inflation during the latter part of the worker's career could erode the
real value of the benefits accrued during prior years, and severely penalize
the worker who changes jobs. Additionally, if the benefit formula were back
loaded, so that the benefit accrual rate rises at some point (e.g., after twenty
years), then changing jobs would also be disproportionately penalized.
DB plan impacts on labor supply. Public DB pension benefit formulas influ-
ence older workers' labor supply decisions because of the very nonlinearity
of their structure.3 These plans generally permit early retirement as early as
age 55, although required service varies widely: some plans subsidize early
retirement by minimizing or even eliminating actuarial reductions for early
retirement, while other plans levy "full" or more than full reductions (i.e.,
over 5 or 6 percent) per year of retirement below age 60 or 65. Not sur-
prisingly, plans covering police and fire department workers tend to have
the most liberal early retirement policies. Many of these plans do not spec-
ify a minimum retirement age, instead basing the availability of retirement
benefits on years of service. These provisions are presumably intended as a
means of shedding workers as their physical fitness declines. Hence police
and fire department workers may be able to retire with full or (partially)
actuarially reduced benefits at age 40, after twenty years of service. Since
many ofthese plans also offer workers the option ofpurchasing service cred-
its for time spent in the military, many of these workers can earn significant
pension rights by their early 40s. This is analogous to the situation in the
federal government, where special agents of the Federal Bureau of Inves-
tigation can retire with full pensions at age 52 with twenty years of service,
and face mandatory retirement at age 55. Similarly, FBI agents receive full
credits for military or prior federal government service.
As mentioned above, benefit accrual patterns are ratherjagged, with some
plans front-loading benefits, others back loading, and still others offering
constant benefit accrual rates. Changes in the rate ofbenefit accrual are typi-
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cally service related, with changes after twenty years of service, and usually
not age related. Additionally, some plans cap benefits at a certain percentage
of final average salary. These differing benefit formulas would be expected
to impact the labor supply decisions of older workers at several points in
time. For example, where the plan does not call for actuarial reductions for
early retirement, we would expect to see a spike in retirement at the twenty
years of service mark for police and fire department workers, or at age 55
for other state and local government workers. We would expect to see simi-
lar spikes at the thirty years of service mark and especially at age 62, the age
when three-quarters of state and local government workers become eligible
for social security. Researching the empirical links between public plan re-
tirement rates and benefit formulas is a task for future research.
Changes in benefit accrual rates after twenty years of service but before
thirty years are also intended to influence the retirement decision. In front-
loaded plans, which typically reduce the accrual rate to one percent per year
of service after twenty or twenty-five years, employees have an incentive to
leave early. Similarly, plans with absolute caps on benefit replacement rates
are probably designed to stimulate older workers' withdrawal. This would be
expected for the Fire and Police Pension Fund of San Antonio, where plan
members are not covered by social security; the benefit accrual rate is 2.0
percent offinal average salary for the first twenty years, 4.0 percent for years
21-25, 3.5 percent for years 26-30, and then a modest 1.0 percent of final
average salary for each additional year of service past thirty years.4
These patterns of benefit accrual rates parallel those ofprivate-sector em-
ployers who also tend to want to induce retirement after twenty to thirty
years of employment. For instance Gustman, Mitchell, and Steinmeier
(1994) show that private DB plans offering subsidized early retirement in-
creased dramatically between 1960 and 1980. The observed heterogeneity
in benefit formulas also suggests endogeneity in public plan design. It must
also be acknowledged that it is more difficult to fire or layoff a worker with
many years of service in the public sector, versus in the private sector. In
this light, DB plans offering early retirement incentives provide a substi-
tute method ofdischarging lower productivity employees. We also recognize
that some employers prefer incentive provisions that tie workers to their
jobs, especially workers receiving specialized training such as police and fire
department personnel and teachers. And for safety workers in particular,
early retirement provisions are important to employers where worker pro-
ductivity may be expected to eventually decline due to physical demands.
The manner in which employee and employer contributions are credited
with interest can also impact retirement and mobility decisions. Approxi-
mately three-fourths of public DB pension plans currently credit employee
contributions with interest.5 Of those plans that do this, roughly 60 percent
use interest rates greater than or equal to 5 percent. Of course, contribu-
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tions would still compound relatively slowly for most employees at the nomi-
nal risk-free interest rate or below. Even where pensions are portable within
the public sector of a state, limits on pension accumulations would deter
mobility in cases where service credits must be purchased.
There have recently been a variety of legislative proposals introduced,
with the aim of increasing portability among different types of pension
plans. Most aspects of these proposals refer to DC plans. For example, one
proposal would permit rollovers between 401(k) and 403(b) plans which
are disallowed under current law. Specifically, this would allow workers with
403(b) and 457 plan assets to use those assets for the purchase of service
credits in public sector DB plans. Another proposal allows rollovers from
IRAs to defined contribution and defined benefit plans.
The Transition to Defined Contribution Pensions
There are several appealing aspects about DC plans in the public sector. We
enumerate these next.
Defined contribution pensions and 17Wbility. When contemplating a job offer,
prospective employees must form expectations about job tenure and even-
tual pension benefits, among other factors. The decision matrix can be ex-
pected to vary with the worker's age at time of employment, expected date
of retirement, and degree of risk aversion. Younger workers, in particular,
may expect to change employers multiple times over the course of their
careers, particularly in light of evidence that there has been a trend toward
increased employment mobility between the 1980s and the 1990s. For in-
stance,Jaeger and Stevens (1998) report a statistically significant increase in
the probability ofemployees having fewer than ten years ofjob tenure, over
time.
In this environment, defined benefit plans become substantially less at-
tractive, especially those with ten-year vesting periods, and DC plans have
increased appeal when long job tenure is not expected due to their en-
hanced portability. Employee contributions vest immediately, and employer
contributions usually vest either immediately or after a wait of one year (a
few require vesting periods of up to five years). Employees who change jobs
and move from one DC plan to another face only the potential loss of pen-
sion rights of nonvested employer contributions. Furthermore, DC pension
rights are neutral with respect to job tenure. Thus workers with vested rights
in a DB plan who leave the firm after five to ten years see their pension bene-
fits frozen in nominal terms based on their salaries at that time, but similar
workers with DC plans continue to accumulate interest income, dividends,
and capital gains in their pension portfolios.
Of course, to receive the benefits of tax deferral, employees who change
jobs and pension plans must either roll their DC balances into new DC plans,
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or else leave their original balances untouched to accumulate over time.
There is evidence that many workers take partial or full lump-sum distri-
butions from their plans when changing jobs and use the proceeds for in-
vestment in housing assets, consumer durables, or immediate consumption
(Samwick and Skinner 1996). Restrictions on rollovers between different
types of defined contribution plans may well contribute to this phenome-
non. Under current law, rollovers are not allowed from 401(k) to 403(b)
plans or in the other direction from 403(b) to 401(k) plans. Currently, ser-
vice credits cannot be purchased with defined contribution plan assets.
Defined contribution pensions and investment risk. In state and local DB plans,
taxpayers of each jurisdiction bear two types of investment risk. (Partici-
pants do bear default risk, but in the United States, this risk is seen to be
low in comparison to the risks borne by taxpayers). First, they bear the risk
of underfunding, which could necessitate a higher tax burden. Taxpayers
could avoid this risk by moving to another jurisdiction in advance of the
future tax increase, but this works only if they move to an area with a better-
funded plan. Second, taxpayers face the risk that the DB plan assets will
generate inadequte investment performance, again producing a need for
higher taxes. Conversely, taxpayers enjoy the upside risk that if investment
performance and funding progress are greater than expected, resulting in
overfunding of the plan, future contributions may be reduced.6
In DC plans, of course, investment risk is borne by plan participants, in
exchange for which they receive flexibility in terms of investment choice.
This flexibility permits individuals to tailor their portfolios in accordance
with their time and risk preferences. While the appeal of a DC approach
is obvious, there remains the concern that financially unsophisticated par-
ticipants may choose portfolios either too conservative or too risky, putting
retirement income security in jeopardy. It should also be said that there is
no a priori reason to believe that DC plans automatically offer a menu of
choices suitable for the varied tastes of plan participants, since investment
choices available in defined contribution plans vary widely.
The appeal of DC investment options has been pointed out in a recent
study offaculty pension plan choices by Clark, Harper, and Pitts (1997), who
examined the choices of new faculty hires at North Carolina State Univer-
sity. These faculty members were given the option ofjoining either the state
government defined benefit plan, or one of three defined contribution plans
includingTIAA-CREF. Over the subsequent five-year period (1990-94),75
percent chose TIAA-CREF, 17 percent chose the DB plan, and 8 percent
chose one of the other two defined contribution plans.
Defined contribution pensions and labor supply. One key way in which DC plans
influence labor supply concerns the interaction between duration of cover-
age and total accumulations. Older workers continue to receive the same
interest accruals on their account balances as do younger workers, subject to
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portfolio composition. Unlike defined benefit plans, with their reductions
in benefit accrual rates after a set number ofyears of service, or explicit caps
on benefits, defined contribution plans have no early retirement incentives.
Indeed, as total accumulations continue to accrue with compound inter-
est, employees may have a strong incentive to work longer in order to enjoy
higher incomes in retirement. However, once total accumulations are such
that retirement income security is assured, employees must then weigh the
tradeoffs of continued employment against their desire for leisure.
Trends to DC Pensions at the State Level
As noted above, several states recently introduced DC pensions for particu-
lar groups ofemployees, and more states are studying the idea ofmaking the
transition from defined benefit to defined contribution plans. Several fac-
tors prompt the increased interest. One is term limits: in states where legis-
lators face limitations on tenure in office, standard DB plans do not provide
the legislators with retirement income security. Indeed, this is the main rea-
son why the state of Colorado switched to a defined contribution plan for its
state legislators in 1998. A second motivation is the desire to shift risk from
the taxpayers to employees; this is related to the goal ofcutting total pension
contributions and the state's total pension cost burden. Another rationale
is the desire of state and local government employees for superior pension
portability and investment choice, linked to private employee enthusiasm
for investing in 401(k) plans.
Several state and local governments sponsor DC pensions as either their
sole plan or as a supplement to their DB plan. In Colorado, in addition to
the legislators' defined contribution plan, several municipalities offer de-
fined contribution plans as the only pension plan. In Michigan, newly hired
state and local government employees (excluding teachers K-12) may join
a defined contribution plan; existing employees were offered the choice of
staying in the DB plan or switching to the DC plan. The state of Washing-
ton offers a hybrid defined benefit/defined contribution plan. The state of
Indiana has a defined contribution supplement to its defined benefit plan
for teachers, consisting of 3 percent of salary. Growing interest in making
a transition from defined benefit to defined contribution plans is reflected
in the number of state legislatures where bills have been introduced to en-
able the transition. Legislation is currently under consideration in Florida,
Georgia, Ohio, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Texas.'
The decision to switch from DB to DC is often made in the context of a
funding discussion. Ceteris paribus, making the transition is easier when a
plan is fully funded or overfunded. The closer a plan becomes to a pay-a!t-
you-go system, and the greater the unfunded actuarial liability, the more
expensive the transition and the lower the probability that taxpayers will
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choose to bear the burden of transition. For example, in Michigan when the
new defined contribution plan was introduced, legislation was passed that
explicitly stated that K-12 employees could not make the transition until the
$3 billion plus unfunded liability of the Michigan Public School Employees
Retirement System was erased by December 31, 1997. The liability was not
paid off and K-12 employees do not, as yet, have the option of a defined
contribution plan. If plan sponsors overestimate the public plan's actuarial
liability, perhaps because expectations of future inflation are too high, then
the funding status of the plan will be better than it seems at first glance and
the transition will seem easier. For instance, some plan administrators are
using long-term inflation assumptions in excess of 4 percent, which prob-
ably gives an overly pessimistic view of the growth of future liabilities.
When to Stay and When to Go in Defined Benefit Plans
One method ofmaking the transition between a defined benefit to a defined
contribution plan is to grandfather existing employees in the old DB sys-
tem and move new employees into a new DC scheme. This eases the admin-
istrative burden, but does not benefit current employees, especially those
with limited tenure, who may wish to participate in the defined contribu-
tion plan. One way in which costs could be reduced in a transition is if em-
ployees assign a high value to the portability, investment choice, immediate
vesting, and other features offered by the DC plan. In this case, employees
might be willing to accept a lower expected value of future benefits in re-
turn for the other advantages ofa defined contribution plan. A closer analy-
sis of such trade-offs is facilitated using a simulation model that computes
the expected future benefits from either staying in a defined benefit plan
or switching to a defined contribution plan after five, ten, fifteen, or twenty
years of coverage in a defined benefit plan. First, we assume that the worker
begins employment at age 35 with a starting salary of $25,000. The worker
receives annual real wage increases of1.0, 1.5, or 2.0 percent per year. In the
DB plan, pension rights are vested after five years of service. Defined benefit
pension rights accrue at 1.5, 1.75, 2.0, or 2.25 percent per year. In the DC
plan, the overall employee and employer contribution rate is 10.0, 12.5, or
15.0 percent of salary. The investment portfolio in the DC plan is assumed
to be 60 percent equities and 40 percent long-term U.S. Treasury bonds,
returning 1926-97 historical average real returns of 7.2 and 2.0 percent,
respectively (Siegel 1998). The real annual portfolio return is accordingly
5.12 percent. Workers who leave the defined benefit plan with vested rights
after five, ten, fifteen, or twenty years of service have their eventual defined
benefit pension rights valued based on their nominal salaries at that time.
Workers who retire at age 65 in the defined benefit plan have their pension
rights valued based on the salary at age 65. Workers who transition to the
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defined contribution plan eventually receive two pensions. The first is based
on their accrued defined benefit rights as of the date they elected to make
the transition. The second is based on their final defined contribution accu-
mulations. These accumulations are the basis for a single life annuity based
on TIAA annuity rates as ofJune 1998 that pays a monthly amount of$759
per $100,000 accumulation (Poterba and Warshawsky 1999).
Given these assumptions, we compute the pensions received under the
different assumed accrual rates and investment return patterns. The annual
pension benefit for a worker who elects to transition to a DC plan after five
years of service in a DB plan appear in Table 3. The table shows the impor-
tance of high contribution rates in the DC plan. When the contribution rate
is 12.5 percent transition is favorable under most combinations of real wage
growth and defined benefit accrual rates. However, if the contribution rate
is 15.0 percent, then transition is unambiguously favorable under all states
except one. Conversely, if the contribution rate is lower, at 10.0 percent,
transition generates higher retirement incomes under only a few states.
The simulations also show the interaction of real wage growth with both
DB and DC accumulations. For example, in Table 3, when real wage growth
is 2.0 percent per year DB pensions after thirty years are higher with accrual
rates of 1.75 percent per year than when benefit accrual rates are 2.25 per-
cent per year but real wage growth is only 1.0 percent per year. Similarly, DC
accumulations and subsequent annuity payments are an increasing function
of real wage growth and contribution rates. Of the two factors contribution
rates are more important for parameter values used in these simulations.
Projected DB and DC pension payments ifan employee transitions to a DC
plan after ten years are shown in Table 4. For mid-range contribution rates
of 12.5 percent transition results in unambiguously higher incomes only for
low rates ofreal wage growth and defined benefit accrual. If the contribution
rate is 10.0 percent then transition results in lower simulated incomes in all
states. However, if the contribution rate is 15.0 percent transition produces
higher projected incomes in more than halfof the real wage growth/defined
benefit accrual states.
Simulation results for transition after fifteen years are shown in Table 5. If
the contribution rate is 12.5 percent then transition generates higher retire-
ment income only if real wage growth is 1.0 percent and the benefit accrual
rate is 1.5 percent. However, if the contribution rate is 15.0 percent then
transition results in higher incomes regardless of real wage growth if the de-
fined benefit accrual rate is 1.50 percent. If the accrual rate is 1.75 percent
then transition produces higher income if real wage growth is 1.0 percent,
and approximately equal income if real wage growth is 1.50 percent. Tran-
sition after twenty years results in lower expected incomes given parameter
values simulated here.8
Two other significant factors are involved in the determination ofpension
TABLE 3. Transition Mter Five Years in Defined Benefit Plan: Results From Real Simulation
Real wage gain 1.0% Real wage gain 1.5% Real wage gain 2.0%
contribution rates of contribution rates of contribution rates of
DB plan accrual rate 10% 12.50% 15% 10% 12.50% 15% 10% 12.50% 15%
DC pension 14,457 18,071 21,685 15,601 19,501 23,401 16,851 21,064 25,276
DB benefit 1,971 1,971 1,971 2,020 2,020 2,020 2,070 2,070 2,070
Combined 16,427 20,041 23,655 17,621 21,521 25,421 18,921 23,134 27,347
1.50% DB pension 15,163 17,585 20,378
DC pension 14,457 18,071 21,685 15,601 19,501 23,401 16,851 21,064 25,276
DB benefit 2,299 2,299 2,299 2,357 2,357 2,357 2,415 2,415 2,415
Combined 16,756 20,370 23,984 17,957 21,857 25,757 19,266 23,479 27,692
1.75% DB pension 17,690 20,515 23,774
DC pension 14,457 18,071 21,685 15,601 19,501 23,401 16,851 21,064 25,276
DB benefit 2,628 2,628 2,628 2,693 2,693 2,693 2,760 2,760 2,760
Combined 17,084 20,698 24,312 18,294 22,194 26,094 19,611 23,824 28,037
2.00% DB pension 20,218 23,446 27,170
DC pension 14,457 18,071 21,685 15,601 19,501 23,401 16,851 21,064 25,276
DB benefit 2,956 2,956 2,956 3,030 3,030 3,030 3,105 3,105 3,105
Combined 17,413 21,027 24,641 18,630 22,531 26,431 19,956 24,169 28,382
2.25% DB pension 22,745 26,377 30,567
Source: Author's calculations.
TABLE 4. Transition After Ten Years in Defined Benefit Plan: Results From Real Simulation
Real wage gain 1.0% Real wage gain 1.5 % Real wage gain 2.0%
contribution rates of contribution rates of contribution rates of
DB plan accrual rate 10% 12.50% 15% 10% 12.50% 15% 10% 12.50% 15%
DC pension 10,404 13,005 15,606 11,407 14,259 17,111 12,512 15,640 18,768
DB benefit 4,142 4,142 4,142 4,352 4,352 4,352 4,571 4,571 4,571
Combined 14,546 17,147 19,748 15,759 18,611 21,463 17,083 20,211 23,339
1.50% DB pension 15,163 17,585 20,378
DC pension 10,404 13,005 15,606 11,407 14,259 17,111 12,512 15,640 18,768
DB benefit 4,833 4,833 4,833 5,077 5,077 5,077 5,333 5,333 5,333
Combined 15,237 17,838 20,439 16,484 19,336 22,188 17,845 20,973 24,101
1.75% DB pension 17,690 20,515 23,774
DC pension 10,404 13,005 15,606 11,407 14,259 17,111 12,512 15,640 18,768
DB benefit 5,523 5,523 5,523 5,803 5,803 5,803 6,095 6,095 6,095
Combined 15,927 18,528 21,129 17,210 20,062 22,913 18,607 21,735 24,863
2.00% DB pension 20,218 23,446 27,170
DC pension 10,404 13,005 15,606 11,407 14,259 17,111 12,512 15,640 18,768
DB benefit 6,213 6,213 6,213 6,528 6,528 6,528 6,857 6,857 6,857
Combined 16,618 19,219 21,820 17,935 20,787 23,639 19,369 22,497 25,625
2.25% DB pension 22,745 26,377 30,567
Source: Author's calculations.
TABLE 5. Transition Mter Fifteen Years In Defined Benefit Plan: Results From Real Simulation
Real wage gain 1.0% Real wage gain 1.5 % Real wage gain 2.0%
contribution rates of contribution rates of contribution rates of
DB plan aarual rate 10% 12.50% 15% 10% 12.50% 15% 10% 12.50% 15%
DC pension 7,086 8,857 10,629 7,888 9,860 11,831 8,780 10,975 13,170
DB benefit 6,530 6,530 6,530 7,033 7,033 7,033 7,571 7,571 7,571
Combined 13,616 15,388 17,159 14,920 16,892 18,864 16,350 18,545 20,740
1.50% DB pension 15,163 17,585 20,378
DC pension 7,086 8,857 10,629 7,888 9,860 11,831 8,780 10,975 13,170
DB benefit 7,619 7,619 7,619 8,205 8,205 8,205 8,832 8,832 8,832
Combined 14,705 16,476 18,248 16,092 18,064 20,036 17,612 19,807 22,002
1.75% DB pension 17,690 20,515 23,774
DC pension 7,086 8,857 10,629 7,888 9,860 11,831 8,780 10,975 13,170
DB benefit 8,707 8,707 8,707 9,377 9,377 9,377 10,094 10,094 10,094
Combined 15,793 17,565 19,336 17,264 19,236 21,208 18,874 21,069 23,264
2.00% DB pension 20,218 23,446 27,170
DC pension 7,086 8,857 10,629 7,888 9,860 11,831 8,780 10,975 13,170
DB benefit 9,796 9,796 9,796 10,549 10,549 10,549 11,356 11,356 11,356
Combined 16,882 18,653 20,424 18,436 20,408 22,380 20,136 22,331 24,526
2.25% DB pension 22,745 26,377 30,567
Source: Author's calculations.
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incomes in these nonstochastic simulations. One is inflation, which erodes
the value of the nominal pension benefit earned at the time of transition
and may depress nominal investment returns as well. However, where the
DB pension formula is computed using final salary, employees are protected
until the time of retirement or transition. Income security in retirement is
then dependent on the manner in which benefits are indexed, if at all. The
second significant factor is the option value of switching to a DC plan. For
example, consider the case of an employee in a DB plan, accruing pension
rights at the rate of 2.0 percent per year, with real wage growth of 1.50 per-
cent per year, offered the opportunity to switch to a DC plan after five years
of coverage under the DB plan. In Table 3 this employee'S eventual benefit
under the DB plan is $23,446. Assuming a contribution rate of 12.50 per-
cent in the DC plan, and with the small benefit earned under the DB plan,
the table gives the eventual pension as $22,194.
Should the employee make the transition or not? That depends on the
value the employee assigns to the DC "call option." The value of the option
is a positive function of the value to the employee of the advantages such as
portability and investment choice offered by the DC plan. Younger workers,
in particular, would be expected to prefer DC plans. Additionally, the option
value of DC plans would be a positive function of time until retirement.
Younger workers can also bear more risk, and may have the ability in DC
plans to choose riskier portfolios, with higher expected returns than in the
generally conservative simulations shown here. Therefore under reasonable
parameters the value of the option would be such that employees would pre-
fer to make the transition to a DC plan even if the simulations show that the
transition would result in somewhat smaller incomes in retirement.
The impact ofattitudes toward risk on the transition choice is unclear. An
extremely risk-averse employee may prefer the status quo and the expected
certainty of an eventual DB pension. But at least in the private sector, many
employers are converting from conventional DB to cash balance pension
plans, a change that may reduce eventual pension benefits ofolder workers.
In the public sector, conventional DB plans may appear more secure, but
a jurisdiction which experiences severe fiscal pressure may feel compelled
to cut pension contributions and hence future benefits for current workers.
Additionally, the DC plan offers control over asset allocation, which often
appeals to employees regardless of risk preferences.
Conclusions
Several issues arise when considering the transition from defined benefit
to defined contribution pensions in the state and local government sector.
While DB plans offer many advantages, a recent trend to DC plans in several
public sector contexts suggests that the private sector trend may be spread-
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ing to the public sector. We show that the appeal of moving from DB to
DC pensions is partly due to the very different retirement wealth accumula-
tions under the two plan types, such that under many transition scenarios, a
worker would have greater retirement income security in a DC than in a DB
plan. For those who value the option, employers may be able to induce em-
ployees to switch pension plans in a way that saves public plan employers-
and taxpayers - money in the long run. The cost savings would come from
paying only small future DB pensions to employees who switch, as opposed
to large DB pensions based on final average salary to those who stay. Hence
a transition option in which employees choose whatever plan was in their
best interest might actually lower employer costs while improving employee
welfare. Calculating the option value of transitioning from a DB to a DC plan
is a direction for future research.
Notes
1. Jurisdictions outside social security generally oppose proposals to include them
in the system, for fear it would have an adverse impact on plan funding status.
2. This conclusion is based on the author's perusal of PENDAT97 survey results.
3. Data from Europe suggest that early retirement benefit patterns strongly induce
early retirement (Gruber and Wise 1999), and in the United States, Costa (1998)
shows that eligibility for reduced and full social security benefits produce upward
spikes in retirement rates at ages 62 and 65.
4. Front-loaded plans too may be designed to influence the date of retirement. For
example, workers in the Illinois Downstate and Suburban Police Fund (who are not
included in social security), have an accrual rate of2.5 percent of final average salary
during the first 20 years of service, falling to 2.0 percent per year from years 21-30,
and then falling again to 1.0 percent per year after 30 years of service. Conversely,
back-loaded plans do not encourage early retirement, unless they have caps on the
maximum benefit replacement rate that can be earned. However, back-loaded plans
often have fairly ungenerous benefit formulae. For example, workers in the Teach-
ers' Retirement System of Illinois plan have a benefit accrual rate of 1.67 percent
of final average salary during the first 10 years of employment, 1.9 percent per year
from years 11-20, 2.1 percent per year from years 21-30, and 2.3 percent per year
thereafter. Hence a worker retiring after 20 years of service at age 65 would receive
a benefit replacement rate of only 35.70 percent of final average salary. A worker re-
tiring at age 65 with 30 years of service would receive a replacement rate of 56.70
percent of final average salary. Plan members are not covered by social security.
5. No data are available on whether and how employer contributions are credited
with interest.
6. Alternatively, unions may lobby for benefit increases.
7. Legislation in draft form also exists in Louisiana.
8. Simulations were also calculated with the following assumptions: The worker
begins employment at age 35 with a starting salary of $25,000 and a nominal wage
growth rate of 4.0 percent per year. In the DB plan, pension rights are vested after
5 years of service. In the DC plan, the overall employee and employer contribution
rate is 12.5 percent of salary. DB pension rights accrue at 1.5,1.75,2.0, or 2.25 per-
cent per year. Investment returns in the DC plan are alternatively 3.0, 6.0, 7.5, 9.0,
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or 12.0 percent per year. Workers who leave the DB plan with vested rights after 5,
10, 15, or 20 years of service have their eventual DB pension rights valued based
on their nominal salaries at that time. Workers who retire at age 65 in the DB plan
have their pension rights valued based on their nominal salaries at that time. DC
accumulations are converted into an annuity as in the simulations described in the
text. These simulations generated results quite similar to those in the text. Details
are available from the author on request.
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